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U.S. PRIVATE EQUITY IN JAPAN: THE ROAD
TO SUCCESS OR THE PATH TO FAILURE
Nicole Simpson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Private equity is the new and improved little black dress of today's
financial world. High-dollar deals are producing a number of significant
returns, record-breaking numbers, and high profile mergers and acquisitions
(M&A). While private equity transactions are steadily increasing once again in
the United States, the real interest in the headlines is the rise in global deals:
"[a]s part of increased global M&A activity [in 2005], worldwide private
equity acquisitions totaled $396.9 billion U.S. dollars." 1 Private equity
transactions increased in 2006 to $757.6 billion, accounting for approximately
twenty percent of the total M&A activity. 2 Major deals involving private
equity investment occurred in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, including Spain,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, and China. 3 As technology continues
to improve and the traditional barriers among nations erode, U.S. firms are
aggressively looking outside the country's borders for prime targets.
Although U.S. private equity firms are entering markets everywhere,
one country of particular interest is Japan. Japan's attraction arises from the
potential for future private equity investment due to a complete transformation
of Japan's corporate and securities law. This comment will focus not only on
the entry of U.S. private equity investment in the Japanese market, but will
also give insight into the potential impact of this union. Part II of this comment
addresses private equity and, specifically, private equity structures in the
United States. Part III briefly discusses the history of the Japanese economy,
identifying some of the recent changes in the country's securities law and the
* J.D. Candidate, University of South Carolina School of Law, 2008. B.S.,
Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of South Carolina, 2005. Special thanks
to Stephen Benjamin who not only inspired the topic of this article but also encouraged
and guided me in the pursuit of my legal education. I would also like to thank the
members of the South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business for their hard
work in editing this article. I dedicate this article to my mother, Doris Simpson, whose
love and support made this article possible.
I CASEY COGUT ET AL., Global Overview, in PRIVATE EQUITY 2006, at 3 (Getting
The Deal Through 2006).
2 CASEY COGUT ET AL., Global Overview, in PRIVATE EQUITY 2007, at 3 (Getting
available
at
The
Deal
Through
2007),
http://www.gettingthedealthrough.com/narrativechapter.php?id=43&sector-id=55.
3 COGUT ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
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reasons behind these changes. Cultural ideals and business environments of
the two countries greatly influence the success or failure of the U.S. private
equity venture into Japan. Part IV compares the corporate and cultural
differences between the U.S. and Japan. Finally, Part V explores how the
combined effects of deregulation in Japan, the U.S. invasion of Japanese
markets, and differences in cultural ideals may affect Japan's economic future.
H. WHAT IS PRIVATE EQUITY?
Private equity securities are not freely tradable on the public stock
market.' In the U.S., private equity transactions occur through a number of
mechanisms, including purchases of stock, asset purchases, tender offers,
mergers, leveraged buyouts, or minority investments in public or private
companies. 2 Pools of capital invested by private equity firms comprise private
equity funds that are subsequently used in private equity transactions. Private
equity funds managers invest in companies ranging from those in the early
stage of development to those at points of expansion and buyout stages. When
investment firms use private equity funds to acquire companies, the
transactions are usually "structured as stock purchases, asset purchases,
mergers, tender offers, or leveraged recapitalizations (e.g. merger of a target
3
and an acquisition vehicle with the target surviving the merger).", Most
4
private equity transactions occur as leveraged buyouts (LBOs) whereby a
"financial sponsor gains control of a majority of a target company's equity
through the use of borrowed money or debt." 5 Investment firms frequently
secure this new debt with the target company's assets and use the debt to pay a
large portion of the purchase price.6 The use of LBOs is controversial, and
opponents continue to view those engaging in leveraged buyout transactions as

I InvestorWords Home Page, "Private Equity," http://www.investorwords.com

(last visited Dec. 12, 2007) (Private equity securities of companies are not listed on a
public exchange. Transfer of private equity is strictly regulated; therefore, any investor
looking to sell his/her stake in a private company has to find a buyer in the absence of a
marketplace. Returns on private equity generally occur in three ways: a merger or sale,
an initial public offering, or a recapitalization).
2 COGUT ET AL., supra note 1, at 155.
3 COGUT ET AL., supra note 1, at 155.
4 See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 166 (8th ed. 2004) (A buyout is "the

purchase of all or a controlling percentage of the assets or shares of a business." A
leveraged buyout refers to "the purchase of a publicly held corporation's outstanding
stock by its management or outside investors, financed mainly with funds borrowed
from investment bankers or brokers and usu. secured by the corporation's assets.")
5 COGUT ETAL., supra note 1, at 155.
61d.
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"Barbarians at the Gate." 7 However, critics of private equity tactics seem to be
in the minority as private equity investment strategies strengthen and outside
forces continue to fuel the private equity boom. In light of private equity
success and profitability, lenders are offering buyout firms "money on the
cheap and with more relaxed loan restrictions than in the past." Institutional
investors, such as pension funds, are allocating more money to private equity
firms, 9 and a number of companies are going private.
A. Going-Private
In light of the dramatic and costly corporate governance reforms,
specifically the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,' ° an increasing number of public
companies are turning to going-private transactions."1 Approximately 1,010
public companies went private in 2006.-12 The primary reason for this
development, is that companies.without publicly traded stock are not subject to
the same degree of oversight and government regulation as companies with
7 See generally BRYAN BURROUGH AND JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE:

RJR NABISCO (1990) (chronicling the battle on Wall Street for control of
food and tobacco giant RJR Nabisco, which ended with a $25 billion leveraged buyout
THE FALL OF

by KKR.); see generally Donald Greenless, Asia joins Europe and the U.S. in private
equity buyout boom, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 21, 2006 ("The book helped foster an
image of private equity firms, and the investment banks they worked with, as
avaricious financiers good at exacting fees from buying, restructuring and selling
companies, but poor at imparting real value." (quoting James Coulter, co-founder of
Texas Pacific Group)).
8 Nicholas Varchaver, Private Equity in 2007: Thanks to cheap debt and
aggressive pensionfinds, 2006 was the year of private equity. So What's in store for
in
the year ahead?, FORTUNE, Jan. 22, 2007,
these dealmakers
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2007/0 /22/8397970/index.ht
m (last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
91d.

10 See generally DAVID G. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. FREER, MICHAEL J. ROBERTS,
GEORGE B. SHEPARD, BUSINESS STRUCTURES 27-28 (Thompson/West 2d ed. 2007) (The
107 thCongress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the wake of financial
scandals in 2000, including Enron, WorldCom, and others. Created during what is
considered to be a nearly complete breakdown of financial accounting and corporate
accountability, Sarbanes-Oxley imposes new processes and responsibilities on auditors,
company management, boards and audit committees, while clarifying the
responsibilities of these parties. "One of the most pervasive parts of the act was
"Section 404" which specified that the company must evaluate its own internal
controls, and that it must do so with a set of procedures that both evaluate the design of
those controls as well as test their operating effectiveness").
1 COGUT ET AL., supra note 1, at 155.
12Varchaver, supra note 11 (According to Dealogic, in 2006 1,010 companies
were taken private in 2006; this number is a large increase "compared with 664 in 2004
and 324 in 2001.")

94

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

[Vol. 4:91

stock offered to the public. Going-private transactions involve the acquisition
of a public company, usually structured as a tender offer followed by a merger
or a one-step merger.' 3 Although going-private transactions are a type of
private equity transaction, they are subject to the disclosure requirements set
forth in Rule 13e-3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.14 However, there
are numerous advantages for companies engaging in going-private transactions
including, "the alleviation of significant expenses relating to compliance and
audit costs, elimination of public disclosure requirements and decreased risks
of liability for directors and management."' 5
The movement of private equity firms into trading publicly listed
stocks and bonds has critics worried because in the course of pursuing buyouts
private equity executives often get access to nonpublic information. 16 Critics
continue to question private equity tactics, noting several emerging trends that
suggest the private equity industry is running unchecked. 17 These
developments include huge dividends and fees, serial charges, debt bombs and
quick flips. 18 In earlier years, buyouts were beneficial even though the sole
'3

COGUT ET AL., supra note 1, at 155; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 ( 1h ed.
8

2004) (tender offer is "a public offer to buy a minimum number of shares directly from
a corporation's shareholders at a fixed price, usu. at a substantial premium over the
market price, in an effort to take control of the corporation"); Franklin A. Gevurtz,
Corporation Law § 7.3, at 673 (2000) ("Broadly speaking, a direct solicitation of a
corporation's stockholders to sell their shares to an acquirer is known as a tender offer
because the acquirer is asking the existing stockholders to tender their shares for
sale."); see generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 826 ( 8 th ed. 2004) (A merger occurs

where "the absorption of one organization (esp. a corporation) that ceases to exist into
another that retains its own name and identity and acquires the assets and liabilities of
the former. Corporate mergers must conform to statutory formalities and usu. must be
approved by a majority of the outstanding share.").
4 COGUT ET AL., supra note 1, at 155; see generally 15 U.S.C. §78a §13e-3 (e)
(1934) (Security Exchange Act of 1934 § 13e-3 (e) "governs the information required to
be included in the disclosure document furnished to holders of the class of equity
securities that is the subject of the transaction." The disclosure requirements are much
greater for a going-private transaction than for other private equity transactions).
15COGUT ET AL., supra note 2.
16Jason Singer, Deals and Deal Makers - Carlyle Will Join Financiers' Move
into Hedge Funds, THE WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2006, at 2.
17Emily Thorton, Gluttons at the Gate, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 30, 2006, at 61.
18Id. (In the case of huge dividends and fees, "firms are pulling record sums from
the companies they own... [and] charging enormous fees for everything from
dispensing advise to covering their taxes." Serial charges are the payments that buyout
firms collect from companies several times a year, which often become so large that the
companies financial strength is impaired. Debt bombs are created when private equity
firms load up companies with so much debt that the companies credit ratings suffer,
sometimes leading to bankruptcy. Finally, quick flips refer to the practice of bringing
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19
purpose, currently the same purpose today, was to generate returns.
Traditionally, investment firms successfully added value to the broken
companies they bought 20 by cutting cost, changing corporate management, and
helping companies make more efficient use of their resources. However,
certain private equity investment strategies encouraging speedy returns have
diminished incentives to make lasting improvements. As a result, many
companies suffer worse financial conditions than before the buyouts. 2I In spite
of these concerns, the private equity business is booming and remains
relatively unregulated. The increase in going-private transactions together with
a number of other factors is fueling this boom with private equity firms
increasing the size and quality of their portfolios.

B. Rise in Consortium & Club Deals
A leading factor in the high-dollar values of private equity
transactions in recent years is rise of consortiums or "club deals. 22 There are a
number of advantages for private equity firms who choose to form a
consortium. Advantages include diversified risk, reduced competition among
private equity funds, and combined expertise in various industries.- These
advantages improve firms' ability to garner large amounts of capital and
permit them to engage in lucrative mergers and acquisitions that are more
profitable2 4 However, the development and formation of a consortium also
poses special challenges. Challenges generally concern the complex
contractual agreements among the different private equity firms. Consortiums
often face contractual issues such as the sharing of governance rights, the
negotiation of mutually acceptable exit mechanisms and the determination of
the material terms of the transacti.on.25 Although consortium deals require a
substantial amount of effort on the transactional side, the increasing number of
private companies to the public stock market quickly sometime less than a year after
buying them.)
'9 Id. at 61.
20 Id.

21 Thorton, supranote 20, at 61.

22 COGUT ET AL., supra note 1, at 3 (Club deals are being used to "garner capital
sufficient to pursue large acquisitions, diversify risk and combine expertise in different

industries" while reducing the competition amonj private equity sponsors at auctions.);
see generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 259 (8t

ed. 2004) (A consortium consists of

of companies that join or associate in an enterprise.").
"a group
23
COGUT ET AL.,

supra note 1, at 3.

24 Id.

25 Id. at 5, 159 (Consortiums must have confidentiality agreements which allocate
responsibility for breach as well as a shareholder agreement that addresses the
obligations of each sponsor in obtaining financing and the differences in targeted rates
of returns, ERISA issues, structuring needs and investment ability).
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"club deals" suggests that the advantages of a consortium outweigh the
disadvantages.
C. Private Equity Targeting Certain Industries
Another prominent development in 2005 was that private equity firms
focused their energy and funds on the technology sector. 26 In addition to the
increase of private equity investment in the technology sector, firms continue
to invest their funds in the traditional areas of industry. Many of these
industries, such as banking, transportation, telecoms, and energy, have specific
regulatory schemes that impose additional requirements on private equity
27
companies wanting to transact business within these regulated industries.
"Typically, approval by the relevant federal and/or state governing agency is
required before transactions in these industries may be completed. 28
Regulators' concerns about competing objectives and heightened
informational requirements contribute to the complexity of private equity
transactions in regulated areas. 29 Even in light of the additional challenges,
private equity firms armed with their extensive financial and business
networks remain a popular investment avenue.
D. Powerhouses in the Private Equity Business
Before moving into the history of Japan's economic development, it
is important to recognize the key players in the American private equity
business. Prominent names include Ripplewood Holdings, Bain Capital, Texas
Pacific Group, the Blackstone Group, the Carlyle Group, Cerberus Partners,
WL Ross and Company, Unison, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Company, and
Thomas H. Lee. This list is not exhaustive and a number of private equity
firms are making big moves in Japan. Ripplewood Holdings was one of the
first U.S. private equity firms to shake up the Japanese market with its
acquisition of the bankrupt Long-Term Credit Bank, the Shineis Bank, in
March of 2000.30 Later in May of 2001, "Ripplewood [also] acquired the
financially troubled audiovisual equipment maker Nippon Columbia Company

26 COGUT ET AL, supra note 1, at 3.
27 Id. at 158.
28 Id.

29 Id. (Regulators often worry about the "creditworthiness of the resulting
business and the long- and short-term objectives of private equity owners." Regarding
informational requirements, U.S. regulatory bodies require a significant amount of
personal and business information from private equity executives).
30

ALTASSETS,

Recent

Trends

in

Private Equity,

http://www.altassets.com/casefor/countries/2002/nz2817.php
2007).

Apr.

5,

2002,

(last visited June 10,
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and the failed Japanese resort complex in Miyazaki prefecture, Seagaia." 31 As
of October of 2006, Texas Pacific Group planned to invest at "least one billion
in Japan to tap accelerating growth., 32 In 2003, Cerberus Partners invested in
Aozora Bank while Lone Star took a substantial stake in the Tokyo Star
Bank. 33 "Carlyle's first Japanese buyout fund was established in 2001 at
Japanese Yen (JPY) 50 billion and has made seven investments in sectors
including healthcare, industrial, automobile, business outsourcing, media and
telecommunications. 34 Two years later in 2003, "Carlyle acquired Kito
Corporation, a leading Japanese manufacturer of hoists and cranes, for a total
purchase price of JPY13.4 billion (US$111.8 million)." Taking the Kito
Corporation private proved successful as the company re-listed on Tokyo
stock exchange in 2007 with shares priced at approximately $3,333 per
share.35 April of 2006, Bain Capital and Advantage Partners acquired MEI
Conlux, a global leader in payment acceptance systems. 36 As private equity
investment gains momentum more firms are targeting the Japanese market.

Ill. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE

ECONOMY AND SECURITIES

LEGISLATION

Japan was once predicted to dominate the world economy. 37 During
the 1950's and 1960's Japan's economic system helped Japan to close the gap
and compete with Western economic systems. 38 Many Japanese industries
31Id.

Takahiko Hyuga, Investing: Buyout firms focus on growth in Japan,
2006,
4,
Oct.
TRIBUNE,
HERALD
INTERNATIONAL
32

http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/03/bloomberg/bxinvest.php2006.

33 Toshio Aritake, The private equity invasion of Japan:Ripplewood and others
are shaking up a traditionally closed market, THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, June 2004,

http://www.allbusiness.com/business-finance/equity-funding/l 64669-I .html.
34 THE CARLYLE GROUP, The Carlyle Group Raises JPY 215.6 Billion Second
Japan Buyout Fund; The Largest Ever Japan-DedicatedBuyout Fund, July 7, 2006,

http://www.thecarlylegroup.com.
35 See generally, The Carlyle Group Home Page, http://www.carlyle.com (last

visited Dec. 12, 2007) ("Over the last four fiscal years, Kito engineered an impressive

surge of nearly 50% in sales revenue and more than four times in operating income.
The aggressive overseas expansion and financial strengthening have cemented Kito's
global leadership position - the largest industrial hoist and crane manufacturer in Japan
and China as well as the second largest inthe U.S. by market share.").

36 See generally MEI, Advantage Partners and Bain Capital.
Complete

Acquisition of MEI Conlux, http://meigroup.com/global/news (last visited Dec. 12,
2007).
37 RICHARD KATZ, JAPAN: THE SYSTEM THAT SOURED, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE

(M.E.
JAPANESE ECONOMIC MIRACLE
www.businessweek.com/chapter/katz.htm.
38 id.

Sharpe

Inc.

1998),

available

at

98
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from autos to electronics had the "potential to become world-class
competitors." 39 However, as. the economy matured to a level equivalent to
Western economies, achieving world-class competitor status required a.
different economical approach. 40 The potentially competitive industries "had
not yet acquired either the economies of scale or the learning-by-doing
efficiencies to be competitive., 4 1 At this crucial point in Japan's economic
development, Japan needed to relax its developmental policies because
companies/industries were no longer in their initial stages of development.42
Unfortunately, during the 1970's, Japan's government and local businesses
chose to reinforce rather than loosen developmental policies.43
Japan's corporate governance was also deemed detrimental to Japan's
economic growth. Noting some of the defining characteristics of the earlier
system in place during the 1980's is necessary for a better understanding of the
changes that have occurred. First, management within corporations consisted
of permanent employees, primarily insiders. 4 The main "objective of
management was to provide steadily growing benefits to its permanent
employees in the form of seniority wages, promotion opportunities, bonus and
severance payments, fringe benefits, [etc.] subject to a reasonable level of
profits. ' 5 Second, the bank was both the supplier and monitor of the
corporation.46 In terms of monitoring, the bank determined whether to
liquidate corporate firms or whether to restructure and bail companies out at its
own CoSt. 4 7 Contributing to the growing problems was the co-mingling of
Japanese politics with the banking industry and corporate governance. The
"one-party rule by the [Liberal Democratic Party] was taken for granted. 4 8
"As inflation continued to affect the economy, Japan developed a connectionoriented or bureaucratic-allocation-oriented economy. 4 9 The aforesaid factors
39Id.
40 Id.
41 id.
42 Id.

43Id.
44Masahiko Aoki, Discussion Paper, Whither Japan 's Corporate Governance?,
STAN.

INST.

FOR ECON

POL'Y

RESEARCH

No.

05-14

(2006),

available at

http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/05-14.pdf.
45
Id. at 3.
6Id. at4.
47 Id.

48 Id. at 4 (The LDP ruled Japan for over half a century. When the leadership of

the LDP came to an end in 1993 it was too late. Japan's financial and real-estate market
bubbles had burst. The deflation period, one of slow growth, became known as "the lost
decade").
49 COLUMBIA BUSINESS CENTER ON JAPANESE ECONOMY AND BUSINESS, ROLE OF
THE CASE OF DAIEI 4

PRIVATE EQUITY IN JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING:
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combined to fuel the bubble economy and ultimately, led to a system of failed
banks.
During the 1990's Japanese banks engaged in an enormous amount of
borrowing subject to high interest rates. 50 After borrowing money from the
51
Euro-market, Japanese banks quickly lent the money to Japanese companies.
Problems arose, in part, because banks granted loans based on personal
connections and alliances rather than financial figures. or accounting.52 The
Japanese banks focused primarily on securing the value of collateral in the
form of real estate against the value of a loan. 53 In order to take advantage of
deferred tax assets, the bank's main goal was to avoid debt forgiveness
through cutting costs and wages.54 In pursuit of this interest, banks continued
55
to lend money to financially troubled companies keeping them running.
In 1987, the collapse of the Tokyo stock market added to the troubled
mix. 56 In the aftermath of the stock market crash, banks were no longer able to
"find easy capital to borrow and had to liquidate many of their overseas
holdings, often at a loss." 57 After the crash, property values, once higher than
those in the U.S., declined. 58 The Japanese government attempted to remedy
the situation by ordering public sector financial institutions to buy stocks and
thus raise prices in stock market. 59 This venture proved ineffective as banks
suffered severe losses from the loans used to purchase property. 60 "In the
aftermath [] of bursting [] land and equity price bubbles in the early 1990's,
persistently high nonperforming loans and a declining value of banks' equity

(2005), http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/japan/alt-investments/eventreports; Masahiko
Aoki, supra note 48 at 4 ("...coalitions among LDP politicians, interest groups and
ministerial bureaucrats were formed in parallel along various industrial, occupational,
and professional lines to protect mutual vested interests of incumbents").

Christopher Wood, The Bubble Economy: Japan's ExtraordinarySpeculative
Boom of the '80s and the DramaticBust of the '90s, ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS, Oct.
50

1992. 5 1
52

Id.
Role of Private Equity in Japanese Industrial Restructuring: The Case of

Daiei,supra note 52, at 4.
53 id.
54 Id.
55

56

id.
Wood, supra note 53.

57 id.
58

id.

59 Id.
6 Id.
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portfolios constrained bank credit and sapped household and business
confidence. 61
A. Post Bubble Period
The bubble period had created excesses in debt, capital, and labor that
burdened the corporate sector. 62 "These imbalances combined to hold down
both investment demand and household income (and thereby consumer
spending.), 63 Japan's economy was in trouble. The problems deepened,
plagued with ineffective solutions and unforeseen external forces, leading to a
period of falling demand and falling prices that persisted for a decade known
as the "lost ten years." 64
In the wake of the "lost ten years," after Japan's bubble economy and
the globalization of the securities markets, Japan drastically changed its
corporate governance and securities law. 65 The past few years have seen
revisions to the Commercial Code and most recently, an entire abolishment of
the Commercial Code in favor of a more flexible corporate regime. In order to
highlight the changes in corporate governance, it is important to note some of
the revisions to the Commercial Code that occurred prior to the enactment of
the Japan's new Company Law in 2006.
Under the 2002 revisions, companies were free to choose from
various options of board structures. 66 Revisions of the 2002 Commercial Code
also made "it legally possible for Japanese firms to allow outside directors to
gain control of the Board of Directors through committees.' '67 Furthermore, the
new laws enabled investors to participate in corporate acquisitions through
share exchanges and allowed exchanges of stock between Japanese firms and
Citrin & Alexander Wolfson, Japan'sBACK!, 43 FIN. AND DEv. 2 (June
2006),62available at http://www.imf.org.
61 Daniel
id.

-

Id.
64 Id.; see generally Masahiko Aoki, supra note 47, at I (the "lost ten years"
63

refers to "the losses of wealth, growth potential, secure permanent employee jobs and

even social morale").
65
66

3 MATTHEW BENDER & Co., DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 1.01 (2005).
Masahiko Aoki, supra note 47, at 4 (stating that the change was to an

"American-type system with independent subcommittees or a modified traditional
system with a semi-independent statutory auditor's board." Also, note that the
companies had a choice but did not necessarily choose to implement the American-type
system).
67 HIROYUKI ITAMI, THE JAPAN INSTITUTE FOR LABOUR POLICY AND TRAINING,
REVISION OF THE COMMERCIAL CODE AND REFORM OF THE JAPANESE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE,

www.jil.go.jp/english/documents/JLROSitami.pdf.
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Japanese subsidiaries of a foreign corporations. 68 Bank-related revival funds,
foreign-owned equity funds, and other financial services replaced commercial
banks as the rehabilitators of financially troubled firmS. 69 The changes paved
the way for sweeping reform in Japan's securities law. Before continuing to
the discussion of the most recent changes in Japan's corporate and securities
law, it is critical to identify the organizations that enact new laws and enforce
regulations.
B. OrganizationsResponsible For The Development And Enforcement Of
Japan'sSecurities Laws
Japan's Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and the Ministry of Finance
(MOF) play a vital role in drafting securities legislation and enacting and
regulating securities laws. The MOJ was responsible for most of the postwar
revisions to corporate law. 70 However, the corporate reforms since 2000 have
been so comprehensive that the MOJ enlisted the resources and expertise of
71
other organizations. One of these organizations is the MOF, which is
responsible for Japan's fiscal and monetary matters. In addition to formulating
the national budget, which is central to fiscal policy, the MOF monitors and
guides banks and securities companies as to current monetary policy, adjusts
the current balance of payments, and determines and maintains what the MOF
considers to be an appropriate level in foreign exchange rates.72
"Securities markets in Japan are generally the markets where
securities transactions are expected to be made at fair market prices in
accordance with Japanese law and ordinances, which are regulated by the
Financial Services Agency (FSA) on behalf of the Cabinet."73 The FSA is
extremely important to the development of Japan's economy. The
organization's principal role concerns "ensuring stability of Japan's financial
system, protect[ing] [] depositors, insurance policyholders and securities
investors, and smooth[ing] finance through such measures as planning and
policyriaking concerning the financial system, inspection and supervision of

68

1Id. at 4.

Masahiko Aoki, supra note 47, at 7-8.
Mark Poe, Kay Shimizu & Jeannie Simpson, Revising the Japanese
Commercial Code: A Summary and Evaluation of the Reform Effort, 2 STAN. J. OF EAST
69

70

ASIAN AFFAIRS
7 id.

71, 73 (2002).

See generally Ministry
of Finance
Sept.
12, 2007).
(last
visited
http://www.mof.go.jp/english
7' DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 68.
72

Japan

Home

Page,

102
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private sector
transactions. 74

financial

institutions,

and

surveillance

of securities

Another important entity involved in Japan's securities regulations, is
Japan's Security Dealers Association (JSDA). JSDA is comprised of "all the
securities companies and registered financial institutions in Japan (as members
of the association). 75 JSDA's stated purpose is to protect investors and to
"promote the implementation of policy measures for the revitalization of the
Japanese securities markets in order to contribute to the growth and
development of the Japanese economy. 76 The association is primarily
responsible for the establishment and enforcement of self-regulatory rules.
Implicit in this responsibility is the execution of "on-site" inspections and
"off-site" monitoring of its member companies as well as strict enforcement of
77
disciplinary actions for violations of statutory and self-regulatory rules.
JSDA also conducts research and studies on potential items of reform and then
presents proposals to the Japanese government and other parties for their
realization. 78 In response to the globalization of the securities markets, JSDA
is actively participating in international conferences, exchanging information
and deepening relationships with [foreign] organizations related to the
securities industry.79 Under the most recent changes in Japan's corporate and
securities law the MOJ, MOF, FSA, and JSDA will maintain control in their
respective areas and continue to influence legislation, law and regulation of
investment practices of Japanese and foreign companies.
C. Japan'sNew Company Law

The most recent and hopeful innovation in Japan's corporate
governance is Japan's new Company Law. Prior to the enactment of the
Company Law in 2006, Japanese law governing corporations and security
transactions existed in a variety of places. 80 The new Company Law is an
74 FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, NEW LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR

http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/policy/fiel/20061010.pdf.
75
Japan's
Securities
Dealers
Association
http://www.jsda.or.jp/html/eigo/aboutpro.html.

PROTECTION,

Profile,

76 id.

77id.
78 Id.

79id.
80 Yoko Okamoto, Changes in M&A transactions brought about by Japan's

2006,
Oct.
AsIALAW,
Law,
Company
http://www.asialaw.com/default.asp?Page=20&PUB=68&ISS0=22742&SID=658305
(Japanese corporate law could be found mainly in three different pieces of legislation

"(i) certain parts of the Commercial Code (Law No.48 of 1899) (the Old Commercial
Code); (ii) the Law for Special Exceptions, etc. to the Commercial Code Concerning
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attempt to integrate all Japan's corporate law into a single updated piece of
legislation incorporating changes in economic and social attitudes. 81 Japanese
legislators intend for the Company Law to "streamline complex regulations of
Japanese companies under the current law, [while providing] diversified
frameworks for corporate governance depending upon the size of the business
and transferability of the shares of the corporation[]. 82 The new set of rules
should "give corporations more flexibility allowing for improved operational
efficiency and83 greater responsiveness to the ever-changing economic
environment.,

Deregulations providing greater convenience and flexibility under the
new Company law include:
*
*

"Less time and money required to set up a new company.
New forms of corporation for increased options when starting a
business.

*
"
"

More flexible corporate governance in line with company scale
and type (listed or unlisted) for reduced operating cost and more
efficient management.
More flexible and more simplified corporate reorganization.
Easier corporate rehabilitation and second chances for
entrepreneurs. 84

While much of the Company Law creates flexibility, a few areas
impose more stringent requirements than the previous law. The guidelines
regarding establishment and disclosure of internal controls are expanded under
the new Company Law to include all large companies ("meaning those with a
capital fund of 500 million yen or more or with liabilities of 20 billion yen or
more").8 5 These disclosure requirements are applicable to private equity firms
that use large funds to invest in Japanese companies.
Not all changes are beneficial or conducive to private equity
investment. The new law now "prohibits continuous business activities of
quasi-foreign corporations (QFC), [which is] a foreign corporation
Audits of a Joint Stock Company (Law No.22 of 1974); and(iii) the Limited Liability
Company Law (Law No. 74 of 1938)").
81Id
82 Akio Kawamura & Shigeki Minami, How CorporationLaw affects foreign
companies,
INT'L
FIN.
L.
REV.,
Dec.
2005,
available
at
http://www.iflr.com/?Page=7&PUBID=213&ISS=21187&SID=605803.
83 id.
84 JETRO, REFORMS UNDER THE NEW COMPANY LAW; WILL IT BE A CATALYST
JETRO JAPAN ECONOMIC
(2005), http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/market/report/pdf/2005_45u.pdf.
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of Japan .but has.,,86its head office in Japan
outside
incorporated in a jurisdiction
.
..
During the
or has the principal purpose of doing business in Japan.
consideration of this provision, the Diet" members expressed concern that the
provision would impede the investment and "business activities of foreign
corporations doing business in Japan through a branch instead of a
subsidiary. 88 In order to alleviate the Diet's concerns, the MOJ stated that "a
foreign corporation that used to engage in or has a plans to engage in
substantial business operations overseas will not be deemed a QFC.
However, the MOJ statement was never officially adopted 90 in the new
Company Law and is considered only a de facto safe harbor rule.
Another facet of the Company Law having broad implications in the
private equity context is the availability of cash mergers. In the past "mergers
in Japan were only permitted if the shareholders of both, merging companies
received shares of the surviving corporation, making it difficult for private
equity funds, which typically pay cash, to acquire Japanese companies by
merger." 91 Acquisitions structured as cash mergers permit private equity funds
to acquire a Japanese company without any remaining minority shareholders.
A cash merger forces all of the target company's shareholders to sell their
shares for cash, so 92long as two-thirds of the target company's shareholders
approve the merger.
D. Triangular Mergers - Hope For Private Equity Investors
When the Company Law took effect in May 2006, one provision and
most beneficial provision for U.S. private equity investors had a
the
perhaps
delayed effective date of one year. The provision effective as of May of 2007
permits the use of triangular mergers providing greater flexibility in M&A
transactions. 93 "[A] direct statutory stock swap between a foreign and Japanese
86 Kawamura & Minami, supra note 86; Kaishah* (Corporations law) (Law no.
821 of 2005).
87 Japan's parliament is called the Diet. Similar to the U.S. legislative structure,
the Diet is divided into the House of Representatives, consisting of 480 members and
the House of Councillors, consisting of 242 members. See generally, House of
Councillors, The National Diet of Japan, http://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/index.htm (last
visited88Dec. 10, 2007).
Kawamura & Minami, supra note 86.
89

Id.

90 Id.

91Gregory R. Salathe & Kunio Namekata, Reform provides M&A opportunities
2006 SuP. INT'L FIN. L. REv., http://www.iflr.com (last visited Dec. 17, 2007).
92 Id.
93 Kaho Shimizu, Triangular Merger: Are new rules kind to hostile mergers?,
THE JAPAN TIMES, May 1, 2007.
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company [I remain prohibited under the new Company Law." 94 Triangular
mergers are mergers that allow an acquiring company to use the shares of their
parent companies to engage in M&A of other companies in Japan. 95 Under the
new Company Law, certain requirements must be met before the triangular
merger will be considered a qualified triangular merger. 96 There will generally
Japanese
be three parties to the transaction: a 100% or wholly owned
97
subsidiary, the foreign parent company, and the target company.
Contrary to popular belief, triangular mergers are not hostile
mergers. 98 These transactions are friendly and do not occur in the securities
market, but instead occur as "corporate reorganizations, which can only
proceed if the internal board of Japanese company agrees first that it wants the
transactions to happen." 99 Specifically, two-thirds of the Japanese target
company must approve the merger.'°° However, there are circumstances where
only approval of the board of directors of the surviving corporation is required.
One such situation occurs "if the amount of assets to be handed over to the
shareholders of the disappearing corporation is less than 20% of the net assets
of the continuing corporation." ' ' 1 Additionally, approval of the controlled
company is not required if a controlling corporation owns more than 90% of
the voting rights of the controlled corporation and makes the controlled
corporation a 100% subsidiary. 102 The permission of the controlled corporation

94 O'MELVENY

& MYERS

LLP,
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1, 2006 (Mar. 29, 2006),
http://www.omm.com/webdata/content/publications/TIJL 03_06.pdf.
95 JETRO, THE SKINNY ON TRIANGULAR MERGERS IN JAPAN (Sept. 2006),
http://www.jetro.org/content/390.
96 See KOJI ISHIKAWA, DLA PIPER, CLIENT UPDATE: JAPAN TRIANGULAR MERGER
(Jun. 8, 2007), http://www.dlapiper.com (search DLA Piper homepage for "Japan
CORPORATIONS

LAW
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Triangular Merger") ("Initially, the efficacy of the new M&A provisions was
questionable because the Japanese tax code would require the selling shareholders to
immediately recognize any capital gains." However, if the merger is conducted
properly, selling shareholders can defer any capital gains tax.).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100

Shimizu, supra note 96.
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/NEWCOMPANIESLAW.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2007) (on file with the author).
102 Id. ("[O]pposing minority shareholders can demand that their shares be
bought" or file suit if they feel that the laws, regulations or the articles of incorporation
are being violated.").
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may be required only
where the controlled corporation is one with restrictions
03
on share transfers.1
"The perceived (perhaps falsely) hostile nature of triangular mergers
was the primary reason the Company Law "delay[ed] the effective date of
[these] deregulation provisions diversifying permissible consideration until the
first anniversary date of the rest of the [Company] law."' 1 4 Whether regarded
as hostile or friendly, triangular mergers are expected to facilitate direct
foreign investment.
E.Delay Allowed Time to PrepareDefenses Against Buyouts and Takeovers
The one-year delay incorporated in the law granted Japanese
companies time to prepare defenses against foreign acquisitions.' 0 5 Now that
deregulation provisions are effective, the MOJ "may impose conditions on the
use of a foreign parent's stock as consideration.' 1 6 However, in the absence of
any restrictions on triangular mergers, U.S. private equity investment in Japan
looks promising.
In sum, the new Company Law allows "greater residual control by
shareholders if they choose it, greater diversity and flexibility of corporate
structure and capital transactions, and new transactions such as triangular
mergers - useful for "squeeze-outs" and cross-border swaps."' 0 7 Managers
have heightened tension and pressure to perform under the new Company Law
08
because they "must raise corporate value if they fear targeting by activists."',
The structural and transactional flexibility arises from the "diverse
alternatives for governance, fewer administrative burdens for small private
companies and adoption of a structure allowing triangular mergers."' 10 9
Corporate CEO's and commentators believe that triangular mergers will likely
stimulate foreign direct investment because "cash can be conserved to be used

103
Id.
104
Kawamura

& Minami, supra note 85.

105RODERICK SEEMAN'S JAPAN NEW COMPANIES LAW,

supra note 104.

106
Kawamura & Minami, supra note 85.
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(June
30,
2006)
http://www.jetro.org/documents/eventdocuments/I 73/173_ACCJBENES_6-3006 l.pdf.
-' Id. at 3.
GOVERNANCE,

°9Id. at 2 (Triangular mergers are friendly transactions that can be used by both
domestic and foreign firms whereby the acquirer can use stock as consideration in
making the acquisition.).

2007]

U.S. PRIVATE EQUITY IN JAPAN

on operation."' 10 Whether good or bad for private equity investment, Japan's
new Company Law is not the only change in corporate governance that private
equity firms will need to consider when investing in Japan. This year private
equity firms will also face the introduction of Japan's new Financial
Instruments and Exchange Law.
F. FinancialInstruments and Exchange Law
In June 2006, the Japanese Diet passed amendments to Japan's
Securities and Exchange Law (SEL), renaming the law the "Financial
Instruments and Exchange Law" ("FIEL"). The FIEL imposes an entirely new
regulatory framework on investment funds, including private equity funds that
11
take the form of a partnership. ' This law will go into effect later in 2007.' 12
The purpose of this consolidation is to increase user protection and develop an
environment where users can invest with confidence, while restoring
confidence in the Japanese market and enhancing the attractiveness of the
Japanese market as an international market."13
The FIEL expands the scope of "securities" covered under the law to
cover collective investment schemes (funds).' 14 This expansion is especially
important to U.S. investors. Instruments covered under the FIEL require
"registration for sales and solicitation operations of securities and derivative
transactions. ' 15 Instruments firms must comply with certain rules when
conducting any financial instruments business. 16 These rules address conduct
concerning obligations on presenting signs, regulations on advertisements,
obligations to deliver documents in a written format before and at the time of a
contract, as well as the principle of appropriateness." 7 The FIEL also prohibits
loss compensation and engagement in "the delivery of false information or
0

Id. at2.
111Adam Wiseberg and Kei Ito, Japan's Securities regulations:following in the
U.S. footsteps? INT'L FIN. L. REv. (SUPPLEMENT - Guide to Japan 2007)
www.IFLR.com (last visited Dec. 12, 2007).
'
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Venture Capital; A Regulatory Revolution, (Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the FIEL
"provides a list of rights and interest that are not in the form of certificates or

instruments are accordingly illiquid, but which are deemed securities for the purpose of
ensuring public interest or investor protection... Accordingly, private equity or venture
capital partnerships will be regulated as deemed securities or Paragraph 2 securities,
regardless of whether they are established in Japan or overseas.") INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
www.IFLR.com (last visited Dec. 12, 2007).
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"solicitation by providing decisive judgments on certain matters."'118 The FIEL
requires institutions defined as a financial instruments business "to register for
and selfself-offering of interests in collective investment schemes
19
management of properties of collective investment schemes."
The FIEL amends the legal name of self-regulatory organizations
made up of a membership of financial instruments, such as JSDA, to
"Financial Instruments Firms Association."' 120 However, these self-regulatory
organizations will continue to provide the oversight of its members through
activities such as "examination aimed at resolving complaints, the mediation
of disputes, the development of self-regulatory rules, surveillance of members
in relation with compliance of the laws, regulations and rules and the
imposition of sanctions for violations."' 2 ' Following in the footsteps of Japan's
new Company Law, the FIEL enhances the effectiveness of internal control
systems by introducing statutory quarterly reporting systems that ensure the
appropriate disclosure of financial and corporate information. 122 The abovementioned changes under the FIEL are only a few among many. The
implications and effect of the FIEL on U.S. private equity investment remains
to be seen. Until the FIEL becomes effective, the Foreign Securities Firms
Law (FSFL) will continue to govern and regulate activities of foreign
investment firms.
The FSFL generally prohibits an unregistered foreign securities firm
from executing the sale or purchase of securities or conducting other securities
23
transactions with any person located in Japan, or from outside Japan."'
Under this regime, U.S. private equity firms opened offices in Japan and
appointed Japanese executives in order to comply with Japan's laws and
participate in lucrative buyouts. A foreign securities firm not registered under
the FSFL is considered an unregistered firm.' 24 Unregistered firms cannot
"engage in securities transactions such as selling or purchasing securities with
any person in Japan or soliciting in regard to offers for the acquisition of
securities."' 125 However, there exist a number of significant exceptions relevant
to U.S. private equity investors.
Many U.S. firms do not satisfy the requirements of a registered firm.
However, the FSFL includes exceptions that provide an avenue for
118

id.

]l191Id.
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122Id.
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unregistered firms to carry out securities transactions from.outside Japan to a
person inside Japan falling within certain categories. 26 These categories
include the Japanese Government or the Bank of Japan; a registered Japanese
securities company; a bank, an insurance company, a credit union, a workers
credit union, a licensed investment advisor; and more. 127 The FSFL requires
any unregistered foreign securities firm to conduct business outside of Japan.
Thus, the FSFL prohibits an unregistered firm from visiting or making calls to
any of the exempted categories of people or carrying out any road show in
Japan. 128 Instead, unregistered securities firms, must direct their marketing
material from abroad. Exceptions enabled some U.S. and other foreign private
equity finns without a Japanese location to participate in security transactions
within Japan. Foreign investors hope that under the relaxed requirements of
the FIEL, private equity activity will increase in Japan.
IV. JAPANESE AND AMERICAN CORPORATE CULTURE AT ODDS

The arrival of foreign private equity funds in Japan has brought a
number of different responses. The proponents of the movement feel that
private equity is re-engineering the Japanese economy in the pursuit of
improved performance and corporate governance. Opponents view the
movement as an invasion comparable to vulture funds worse than Barbarians
at the Gate. Hesitancy and doubt about the future of private equity in Japan
arises in part from the two country's cultural differences.
Japan has historically been a closed market. 129 Self-nationalism and
the belief that "physical assets in [Japan] should also be owned and managed
by the Japanese people as an independent nation," pervades the corporate
world of'Japan and conflicts with American ideals of capitalism. Japanese
culture does not promote .the concept of survival of the fittest, which would

126

Id.

Id. (The FSFL further provides exceptions for "an investment management
company of a registered investment company (within the limitation of certain securities
127

transactions made on behalf and for the account of the investment company); a bank, an
insurance company, a credit union, a workers credit union, Norin Chukin, Shoko
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limitation of its authorized security business; a bank (within the limitation of certain
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certificate)").
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widen the income gap and raise social cost., 130 Many Japanese citizens view
companies as belonging to the long-term employees who are committed to
them rather than to the shareholders.13 These cultural perspectives of
corporate governance differ vastly from the American ideals of corporate
governance and economics. However, some feel that these beliefs led to and
helped sustain the "lost ten years" after the bubble economy.
American corporate culture centers on the belief that the shareholders
are the owners of a corporation. In light of this view, companies deem massive
layoffs and wage cuts a necessary if in the best interest of the company (the
shareholders). In the corporate world, the phrase, "Survival of the fittest,"
embodies the principle that failing companies should and will die. The theory
of market capitalism incorporates these ideas. Market capitalism includes
guiding principles such as:
*
*
*
"
*

"Sustained economic growth as the way to human progress
Free markets without government "interference" [is] the most
efficient and socially optimal allocation of resources
Economic globalization [is] beneficial to everyone
Privatization removes inefficiencies of the public sector
Governments should mainly function to provide the
infrastructure to advance the132rule of law with respect to
property rights and contracts."

The law's treatment of American corporations as individuals
possessing rights as an individual strengthens these ideals. The profit-seeking
goal of American corporations creates inherent conflicts when transacting
business in Japan. Although Japan's new Company Law incorporates many
ideals of the American corporate system, implementation and acceptance of
structural changes will take time.
V. WHAT ARE THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION, U.S. INVASION,
AND JAPANESE IDEALS ON THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT IN
JAPAN
One question remains - What does the future hold for U.S. private
equity investment in Japan? Most private equity investors are both optimistic
and uncertain, as with investment in any sector and in any country. Attracting
130 COLUMBIA BUSINESS CENTER ON JAPANESE ECONOMY AND BUSINESS,
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foreign investment in Japan are the facts that "Japan has the second largest
economy, [Japan's] asset values may be close to bottoming out, [and] Japan
has recently revised its insolvency regimes."133 "When considering an
investment in Japan, one must take into account the inherent challenges of the
Japanese economy, such as the capital demand/supply imbalance, the
hollowing out of the manufacturing base, deflation and the difficulties
associated with the banking system."134 Unison's partner and co-founder Mr.
Ehara stated that the Japanese buyout market is modest and that it is not
accurate to view this market as if a floodgate had just opened for private equity
activity.135 However, he predicts steady growth in Japan.136 Ripplewood
management feels that the investment environment in Japan is becoming
attractive as macroeconomic forces continue to drive change and the
government recognizes the importance of new forms of capital and foreign
investment. 137 Timothy Collins, CEO of Ripplewood holdings LLC, recently
stated that "[pirivate equity can be a positive vehicle for change, a positive
lubricant, and can play a positive role in bringing 'the
Japanese economy back
38
to its former pre-eminence in the world economy."'
Proponents of private equity investment identify advantages of
foreign investment in Japan, including the capability to realize changes,
implementation of new expertise and the identification of global partners. 139 If
private equity firms can exploit these advantages by creating value in the
Private
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2007) (Wilber Ross describing private equity investment in financial service companies
in Japan in the context of his firm's acquisition of Kansai Sawayaka Bank (KSB),
formerly Kofuku Bank.).
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rowingjapaneseeconomy (last visited Dec. 31 2007) (John Ehara, Partner and CoFounder, Unison Capital Inc. presenting his "views on the contributions of private
equity firms to economic growth and business development in Japan." Mr. Ehara
predicts there may be 80 transactions in 2006, up from the 14 transactions in 1996 and
67 in 2005).
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companies they acquire, then the opposition in Japan should decrease. 140 One
of the most significant reasons 4for the enormous potential for value creation is
'
that Japan is ready for change. 1
On the other hand, the exit strategy of many private equities has
fueled concern that private equity buyouts are not beneficial to Japan in the
long-term. Investment firms are taking the cash value out of many companies
and then reselling. One of the biggest hurdles private equity has to overcome is
the Japanese attitude towards big layoffs. Recently, Japanese labor unions
launched a task force to challenge private equity funds targeting certain
companies. 142 Unions and other opponents of private equity investment are
concerned about private equity investors' disregards for labor rights, job
security for employees, and working conditions. Union International Network
(UNI) is at the forefront, with the "aim of challenging private equity bids" and
"lobbying pension funds, which are helping to fuel a buyout boom by
investing in private equity with the hope of making substantial returns for
investors."'143 The union backlash arises in the wake of the Japanese corporate
reform and demonstrates one of the few barriers U.S. private equity firms will
have to overcome.
Further affecting the future of private equity in Japan are the facts
that "accounting systems aren't transparent, bankruptcy laws are inadequate,
[and] the judicial process is slow."' 44 Paul Slawson, the managing principal for
EastPoint Capital Management, noted that "Japan has proportionately less
accountants than in the [U.S.]: whereas there are 350,000 accountants in the
[U.S.], there are only 13,000 in Japan."' 145 The deficiency of accountants in
Japan coupled with new disclosure and due diligence requirements comparable
46
to those in the U.S. is likely to produce lengthy delays for investment.
Although the new Company Law now in place is more flexible and user
140 Id. at
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friendly, Japan does not have an adequate number of accountants or lawyers to
cope with massive corporate restructuring. 147 Most importantly, there are no
guarantees that a Japanese government, suspicious of American culture and
ideas will not reverse the new laws by imposing harsh restrictions on foreign
investment. The volatile nature of the stock market together with the
uncertainty of the practical effect of Japan's new laws and the concerns noted
in this comment make U.S. private equity investment in Japan unpredictable at
best. However, for now, the trend is toward success.

